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CUTTING THROUGH THE FOREST OF THE STANDING
DOCTRINE: CHALLENGING RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANS
IN THE EIGHTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS
Kelly Murphy*
I. INTRODUCTION
What are forest plans? Congress, through the National Forest
Management Act, requires them, citizens rely upon them, the Sierra Club
challenges them, and the Forest Service defends and implements them. But
no one agrees on the the true essenc& of forest plans. Are they strategic
planning devices to implement the management objectives of Congress?
Are they programmatic tools undertaken simply to give vague direction and
guidance for forest projects? Or, are they blueprints that directly affect on-
the-ground decisions of forest management? Although the confines of the
plans are controlled by legislation, the degree of impact on ground level
activities of the Forest Service is hotly debated.
The Forest Service,' an agency within the Department of Agriculture,
prepares forest plans as part of its management of the National Forest
System.2 This management of the National Forest System is not a simple
or isolated agency action. With 191 million acres involved, the administra-
tion of this system impacts national, regional, and local levels. For example,
the federal timber harvest amount, an integral aspect of forest planning, is
the gauge from which private harvesting is measured. Reductions or
increases in the federal harvest amount can dictate the level of private
* Assistant Attorney General for the State of Arkansas, Environmental and Utilities
Division; B.A. 1991, Rhodes College; J.D. 1994, University of Arkansas at Little Rock;
LL.M. Expected 1996, Northwestern School of Law at Lewis and Clark College. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and are not expressed on behalf of the Office of the
Attorney General.
1. The Forest Service, which follows a decentralized style of management, is divided
into four management levels: Chief of the Forest Service, regional foresters, forest
supervisors, and district rangers. The regional foresters administer the nine regional offices
while the forest supervisors manage the 155 national forest units, such as the Ozark and
Ouachita National Forests. Each forest unit's day-to-day management decisions are made
at the forest supervisor level. DONALD C. BAUR ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW HANDBOOK 178 (1991). Several sources provide guidance in the complex
task of managing the nation's forests. The agency's primary statutes are found in Title 16
of the United States Code and the implementing regulations are at 36 C.F.R. Group 200.
The Forest Service produces a forest service manual along with a line of handbooks for more
comprehensive direction.
2. The National Forest System contains 155 national forests, 20 national grasslands,
and many areas of valuable mineral and range resources. DONALD C. BAUR ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW HANDBOOK 177 (1977). See infra part II,
including note 25 and accompanying text for a more complete history.
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production. Nationally, reductions in the federal harvest in the Pacific
Northwest, due in part to the spotted owl controversy, have led to a
heightened demand for southern timber. As a result, production in and
profits from southern forests, particularly private holdings, have increased.3
The relationship between National Forest System supervision and its local
impact is acutely felt in areas with large amounts of federal forestland and
in states dependent on the forest industry. Arkansas generally falls within
both categories.4 Unlike the majority of eastern states (states east of the
hundredth meridian), a significant portion of Arkansas is federally owned,5
due largely to the amount of National Forest and National Park land within
the state.6
With forestland covering over one-half of Arkansas, the forest and the
timber industries are vital parts of the economy and way of life.7 Forests in
Arkansas directly employ some 40,000 persons while the forest products
industry provides one out of every five manufacturing jobs in the state.8
3. Telephone interview with Roy L. Murphy, Chief Executive Officer, Mid-South
Engineering Co. (an engineering firm that specializes in the design of forest products
facilities) (Mar. 8, 1995).
4. Id. In Arkansas, as may be the case for other states with high federal forest
ownership, the federal harvest level of the local forest units acts as a stabilizing mechanism
for the local forest industry as a whole. Id.
5. The total land area of Arkansas, excluding inland waters, is approximately 33.6
million acres. The total acreage owned by the federal government is around 3.4 million
acres. This represents 10.2% federal ownership as compared with other regional states such
as 1.7% in Alabama and Texas, 2.2% in South Carolina, 3.6% in North Carolina, 4.6% in
Missouri, 5.5% in Mississippi, and 6.1% in Georgia. Eastern seaboard states have much less;
for example, 0.7% in New York, 1.6% in Massachusetts, and 2.8% in New Jersey. U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1990 5, tbl. 4 (1989).
6. The National Forest System consists of 2.5 million acres of land in Arkansas. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. (114th ed. 1994). The gross
area within the National Forest System boundary in Arkansas is 3.49 million acres. This
total includes private and public lands within the unit boundary. Id.
7. Approximately 51% of Arkansas is forestland of which 15.9% is federally owned.
FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., RESOURCE BULL. No. SO-141, FOREST STATISTICS OF
ARKANSAS COUNTIES (1988). Of the 16,673,000 acres of forestland in Arkansas, 15.9% is
owned by the federal government, 2.1% is state-owned, and 81.9% is privately held. This
percentage of federally managed timber is the highest for the southern area states of
Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE & METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK 177 (4th ed. 1991).
Another source cites the total forestland acreage of the state at 17.24 million acres not
including non-commercial timberland. The breakdown by ownership is 18% government
(federal, state, county, and city), 25% private forest industry, and 57% private non-industrial
landowners. FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., RESOURCE BULL. No. SO-141, FOREST
STATISTICS OF ARKANSAS COUNTIES (1988); UNIV. OF ARK. BULL. No. 908, THE ARKANSAS
FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRY (1988).
8. Each forest products manufacturing job equates to at least three additional jobs in the
forest industry. The value added by the forest products industry leads the manufacturing
(Vol. 18
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However, the forests represent more than just economic benefits to the state.
They also provide recreational opportunities, aesthetic and environmental
beauty, and wildlife habitat. Forest management has many effects ranging
from economic to recreational to environmental to aesthetic. Forest
management affects fish and wildlife habitats for hunting and fishing, hiking
trail availability, and river management. Other effects of management can
be felt by adjoining landowners who may object to clearcuts within the view
of their property and the resulting erosion. Also, property values can rise
or fall according to nearby forest opportunities.9
Congress enacted the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources
Planning Act of 197410 (Resources Planning Act) to guarantee the sustain-
able development and management of our National Forests. A few years
later, in response to litigation, Congress passed the National Forest
Management Act of 1976," amending the Resources Planning Act and
requiring the Forest Service to conduct strategic planning for the manage-
ment of the forests. The National Forest Management Act directs the Forest
Service to develop land and resource management plans for each forest unit
in the National Forest System. 2 At the local level, these so-called "forest
plans" establish standards and guidelines for each forest's management. The
plans must be prepared in accordance with the National Environmental
Policy Act, which requires each federal agency to consider the environmen-
tal impacts of agency actions.' 3 It has taken several years for each forest
sectors of the state. The annual stumpage value of the state's timber resource is estimated at
$237 million. FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., RESOURCE BULL. No. SO-141, FOREST
STATISTICS OF ARKANSAS COUNTIES (1988); UNIV. OF ARK. BULL. No. 908, THE ARKANSAS
FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRY (1988).
9. The Ozark and Ouachita Forests plans influence each of these concerns.
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994).
11. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 83 Stat. 852
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). See also supra note 10.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994). National and regional plans are also prepared. See 36
C.F.R. § 219.4 (1994). The Planning Act Assessment and Program is the mechanism for
national planning. The assessment, prepared every 10 years, provides an inventory of forest
resources and current and proposed Forest Service programs, as well as an analysis of the
supply and demand for timber and other renewable resources. 16 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994). The
Planning Act Program, submitted to Congress on five year intervals, reports the agency's
forest management recommendations, budgetary needs, and expected production of national
forests. Id. § 1602. An annual report must also be prepared which evaluates the achieve-
ment of the program objectives. Id. § 1606(c). Regionally, a plan is developed to guide
region-wide administration and policy. It is subject to the National Environmental Policy
Act. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.8-.9 (1994).
13. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604 note 1 (1994). The National Environmental Policy Act is
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994). The National Environmental Policy Act requires
all federal agencies to consider the likely environmental effects of their activities. Section
101 establishes as the ongoing "policy of Federal Government to use all practicable means
1996]
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plan to be developed, but today most of these plans are complete 4 and they
will guide the forest activities for the next ten to fifteen years. 5
Citizens groups, environmental groups, and industry alike have
attempted to initiate judicial review of National Forest Management Act
plans.'6 The lawsuits involve issues ranging from the substantive and
procedural mandates of the National Management Forest Act, the environ-
mental impact statement requirements of the National Environmental Policy
Act, and the regulations of the Endangered Species Act. 17 The causes of
action frequently raise issues in all three areas, but most cases focus on the
first two acts. Plaintiffs' claims under the National Forest Management Act
usually fall within two groups: those disputing the plan as a whole and those
concerned with the specific activities of the Forest Service, such as land and
resource allocations or individual timber sales. The National Environmental
Policy Act claims challenge the adequacy of the environmental impact
... to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony." National Environmental Policy Act § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1994). To
implement this broad directive, § 102 requires that all federal agencies prepare an
environmental impact statement for each proposal for legislation and other "major federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." National Environmental
Policy Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1994). The environmental impact statement must
include a detailed statement of environmental impacts, alternatives to the proposed action,
and any irretrievable commitments of resources.
The procedure for determining whether an agency should prepare an environmental
impact statement has three stages. Initially, the agency must determine if the action is one
in which an environmental impact statement is normally required or if the action is one in
which an environmental impact statement is normally not required. Id. If the action falls
outside of these two categories (in other words, into the "gray area" in between), the agency
must prepare an environmental assessment. Id. If, on the basis of the environmental
assessment the agency determines not to prepare an environmental impact statement, it must
make a finding of no significant impact. Id. If, however, the activity will result in
significant impact then an environmental impact statement must be prepared. Id. A forest
plan falls within the first category of always requiring an environmental impact statement.
14. The National Forest Management Act requires that the Forest Service "attempt to
complete" the plans by September 30, 1985. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(c) (1994). By 1987 only a
few plans had been completed and released for public review.
15. See infra notes 53 and 168.
16. For circuit court opinions, see Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995);
Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994); Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d
1300 (9th Cir. 1994); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993); Portland
Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993); Idaho Conservation League v.
Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992). For recent district court opinions see Wind River
Multiple-Use Advocates v. Espy, 835 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Wyo. 1993); Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Thompson, 811 F. Supp. 635 (D. Utah 1993); Sierra Club v. Cargill,
732 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Colo. 1990), rev'd, 11 F.3d 1545 (10th Cir. 1993); Citizens for Envtl.
Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989); Intermountain Forest Indus.
Ass'n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Wyo. 1988).
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1542 (1994).
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statements prepared in conjunction with forest plans and activities. A
challenge under the National Environmental Policy Act may also be made
against an individual activity on the basis that the agency did not prepare an
environmental impact statement when one may have been required.
Would-be challengers to forest plans must first overcome the jurispru-
dential obstacles of standing and the related doctrine of ripeness before
courts will hear the merits of their grievances. As in any case, a plaintiff
must show that he or she has a legally recognized interest in the outcome
of the action. This burden, standing to sue, is a concept originating from
Article III of the United States Constitution, the "cases and controversies"
clause, that has been further developed by the United States Supreme Court.
Plaintiffs in cases questioning specific Forest Service management activities
have had a much easier task in establishing standing than plaintiffs in cases
attempting to challenge a forest plan.'
As to this standing hurdle, two recent United States Supreme Court
cases have tightened the requirements of environmental standing.'9 The
circuit courts have not agreed on what these cases mean for plaintiffs
disputing a forest plan. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit recently held that forest plans are not challengeable because, as mere
programmatic tools, they cannot inflict injury sufficient to sustain a standing
inquiry.2" The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a
frequent forum for environmental litigation, has allowed plaintiffs to bring
actions contesting the validity of forest plans.2' The Ninth Circuit's
holdings are based on the determination that adoption of a forest plan and
the resulting management under the plan can result in an actionable injury.22
This article is intended to explore this split in the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits and the resulting impact it may have on future litigation of forest
18. The reason for this, as will be discussed infra in parts III and IV, is the distinction
drawn between specific forest activities, such as timber sales, clearcuts, and pesticide
applications, and the plan that authorizes these activities as "agency action." The question
lies in whether the adoption of a plan results in an injury that is direct enough to establish
standing.
19. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Lujan II); Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (Lujan 1).
20. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994).
21. The Ninth Circuit has found that grievances based on forest planning can result in
an injury in fact. Ninth Circuit cases which have denied standing in this context have
generally done so because the plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to establish injury in fact
or did not satisfy another element of standing such as the zone of interests or final agency
action under the Administrative Procedure Act.
22. See Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 1994); Portland Audubon
Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1993); Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992).
1996]
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plans and, by extension, other land and resource management plans such as
those prepared by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park
Service.23 Part II attempts to determine the nature of forest plans by
reviewing the history and implementation of forest planning. This analysis
will demonstrate Congress's intention for management plans to occupy a
vital role in the disposition of the nation's natural resources. Part III
explains the constitutional and prudential requirements of standing and the
related doctrine of ripeness. Part IV examines the rationale behind each
circuit's position by reviewing Sierra Club v. Robertson, a recently decided
Eighth Circuit case, and Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, a representative case
from the Ninth Circuit. Part V discusses the arguments for and against
allowing forest plans to form. the basis of standing. Finally, Part VI
concludes with a brief review of the consequences of each circuit's position
if either is adopted by the Supreme Court as the proverbial "law of the
land."
II. FOREST PLANNING
Managing some 191 million acres of land in forty-three states, 4 the
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, is one of the major federal land
management agencies.2 Guided by several statutes including the Multiple-
23. All major public land management agencies, such as the National Park Service, the
Bureau of Land Management, the Forest Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service, must
engage in land and resource planning. The Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management both must manage according to multiple-use criteria. The Forest Service's
planning activities are controlled explicitly in the Planning Act, the National Forest
Management Act, and the Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act. See infra notes 31-40 and
accompanying text. The Bureau of Land Management's specific congressional mandates for
planning are contained in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1782 (1988), which was signed into law by President Gerald Ford on the same day
as the National Forest Management Act. Although the planning guidelines for the National
Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service are highly detailed, these agencies do not
have to take into account the entire extent of commercial development. See 16 U.S.C. § 1
(1994) (National Parks) and 16 U.S.C. § 668(dd) (1994) (National Wildlife Refugees).
CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE
NATIONAL FORESTS 11 (1987).
24. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CONGRESS, PUB. No. OTA-
505, FOREST SERVICE PLANNING: ACCOMMODATING USES, PRODUCING OUTPUTS, AND
SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS 3 (1992).
25. The creation of the National Forest System began in 1876 when Congress took
initial steps to protect and manage the nation's forest lands by appropriating money for the
preparation of a report on forestry issues. After several decades of homesteading the public
lands to settlers and prospectors, the government had, in the late 19th century, begun to
withdraw lands from disposition. In 1891 the first forest withdrawals or reserves were made
pursuant to the Forest Reserve Amendment, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed 1976). Initially within
a division of the Department of Interior, the administration of the forest reserves was
[Vol. 18
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Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, the Resources Planning Act, and the
National Forest Management Act, the Forest Service is responsible for
providing a wide range of products and managing many different uses of the
land in the National Forests. Management must provide for such diverse
considerations as timber, grazing forage, minerals, fuels, wildlife habitat,
watershed, and recreational use.
26
Although there was no official Forest Service until 1905, Congress
authorized general management of the forests reserved under the 1891 Forest
Reserve Amendment in the Organic Act of 1897.27 This Act provided for
management of the reserves to ensure favorable water flow and timber
supplies.28 After its official creation in 1905, the Forest Service was unique
among federal bureaus because it was decentralized and efficient, yet exuded
transferred to the Department of Agriculture in 1905. Transfer Act of Feb. 1, 1905, ch. 228,
§ 1, 33 Stat. 628 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 472 (1994)). In 1907 the reserves were officially
designated the National Forest System. Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1256, 1269.
For a comprehensive history of the Forest Service and the National Forest System, see
CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE
NATIONAL FORESTS (1987); H. STEEN, THE UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE: A HISTORY
(1976); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Forest Service: A Call for the Return to First Principles,
5 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1984); James L. Huffman, A History of the Forest Policy in the
United States, 8 ENVTL. L. 239 (1978).
26. See infra notes 36 and 37 and accompanying text.
27. The Forest Reserve Amendment, or the "Creative Act," gave the President the
authority to "set apart and reserve [land], in any State or Territory having public land bearing
forests, in any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth,
whether of commercial value or not, as public reservations." 16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed by
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (1976)). On March 30, 1891, less than one month after
the passage of the Forest Reserve Amendment, President Hardin exercised his new discretion
and reserved and established the Yellowstone Park Forest Reserve. By the mid-1890s,
Hardin had reserved a total of 13 million acres in 14 new reserves. WILKINSON & ANDERSON,
supra note 23, at 18, n.57.
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 472-482 (1994) (§ 476 repealed in 1976). Section 475 states that the
forests may only be established "to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or
for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States." 16 U.S.C. §
475 (1994).
By 1911 the majority of forest lands reserved from disposition of the public domain
were located in the western United States. Congress provided for federal acquisition of
valuable timber production land by purchase or land exchange in the Weeks Law (codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 515-520 (1994)). This Law was enacted to create national forests in the
eastern United States, where there was a lack of public domain.
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an air of professionalism.29 The agency also enjoyed wide discretion within
the parameters of its management of the resources under its care.30
Forest planning first began at the Forest Service under the leadership
of Gifford Pinchot.3' Pinchot is frequently cited today as the father of
modem forestry, and his "brand of conservation and silviculture effectively
became official policy" when he gained control of the Forest Service in
1905.32 After the Transfer Act of 1907, he required "working plans" for all
proposed timber sales to ensure a sustainable annual timber yield.3 3 Other
types of plans, such as for range, conservation, recreation, and wilderness
uses, became a central activity at the Forest Service, although timber supply
remained the primary planning objective until Congress involved itself in
forest planning in the 1960s and 1970s.
34
Congress first announced its intentions toward the Forest Service's
control over the forests in 1960 with the passage of the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act.3 Although it had been the practice at the Forest
Service since the outset, the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act required the
Service to manage its lands from a multiple-use perspective.36 The Act
29. This reputation was partially the result of the leadership of Gifford Pinchot, the chief
forester of the Department of Agriculture's Division of Forestry from 1898 until the forest
reserves were transferred from the Department of the Interior to the Department of
Agriculture in 1905. At that time Pinchot became the first Chief of Forestry over the newly
created Forest Service. Pinchot's influence over his close friend Theodore Roosevelt is
thought to be the reason behind not only the massive presidential forest land withdrawals of
the late 18th and early 19th centuries, but also the fairly unusual switch from the Interior to
the Agriculture Department. His theories and techniques of forestry led to the decentralized
style of management in the Service and its unique independence as a federal agency. See
GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND (1947) (Pinchot's autobiography) and HAROLD
W. WOOD JR., PINCHOT AND MATHER: HOW THE FOREST SERVICE AND PARK SERVICE GOT
THAT WAY (1976).
30. Until recently, the congressional mandates were generally thought simply to mean
that the Forest Service was "to harvest timber on the national forests in the manner it thought
best." See COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCE LAW (3d ed. 1991).
31. See supra note 29.
32. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 30, at 606.
33. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 20-21. Pinchot advocated the
conservation tradition of planning as opposed to the utilitarian theory. He expected each
planner to develop a comprehensive inventory of forest resources, to exclude sensitive areas
or areas in need of protection from use, to monitor the conditions of the forest, and to
ascertain the sustainable levels of use. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 23.
These four characteristics are incorporated into the modem version of planning under the
National Forest Management Act.
34. Planning followed in a path from timber and range plans during the Pinchot era, to
recreation and wilderness planning in the 1920s and 1930s, to land use plans under the
mandate of Congress in the 1960s and 1970s. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at
15-45.
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
36. The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act was congressional ratification of reality.
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declared that "the national forests are established and shall be administered
for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish
purposes."37 The Act further stated that this mandate is supplemental to the
purposes set forth in the 1897 Act (water flow and timber supply).3" Courts
have held that the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act provides no judicially
enforceable standards as it is phrased in sweeping and expansive language39
that gives the Forest Service broad discretion in the specific use of a given
area.
40
The current system of forest planning was imposed upon the Forest
Service by the Resources Planning Act, which had the principal purpose of
requiring nationwide strategic forest planning to assure the continued
productivity and sustainability of our natural resources.4' According to the
Attempting to address the demands of all the users of the forest (the recreational segment,
ranchers, timber operators, and reclamation interests), the Forest Service needed further
guidance as to its mission. It seems the Forest Service walked a narrow line and requested
clarification of purpose legislation while simultaneously arguing it had whatever authority
it needed already. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 30, at 622.
37. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994). The order of this list of uses was of particular importance.
Although it was in alphabetical order, in an attempt to pacify the growing recreationist
movement, the term "outdoor recreation" was put at the head of the list by adding "outdoor"
to "recreation" and rearranging the common phrase "fish and wildlife."
38. Id.
39. "Multiple use" is defined in the act as "the management of all the various renewable
surface resources of the national forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will
best meet the needs of the American people." 16 U.S.C. § 531 (1994). "Sustained yield"
means "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular
periodic output of the various renewable resources of the national forests without impairment
of the productivity of the land." Id.
40. The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act has been a frequent target for criticism from
commentators and courts alike. Its directives are stated in broad and imprecise language,
which has led to the argument that it does not offer any true guidance for forest
administration, nor does it contain any judicially reviewable standards. See Perkins v.
Bergland, 608 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1979); C. REICH, BUREAUCRACY AND THE FORESTS (1962)
(considering the breadth of the Act's mandates); Comment, Managing the Federal Lands:
Replacing the Multiple Use System, 82 YALE L.J. 787 (1973) (suggesting abolition); Steven
E. Daniels, Rethinking Dominant Use Management in the Forest-Planning Era, 17 ENVTL.
L. 983 (1987) (arguing for a dominant and multiple use combination approach). It is
arguable that, because it gives so much discretion, the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act is
an impermissible grant of legislative authority.
41. Passage of the Resources Planning Act was basically an attempt to provide the
Forest Service with higher appropriations so it could better achieve its objectives. The Forest
Service is not self-sufficient, but musi rely on annual appropriations from Congress for its
operating funds. The Resources Planning Act requires the periodic submission from the
Forest Service of an assessment of the forest renewable resources, a program of proposed
goals, and an annual report detailing the acheivement of program objectives. 16 U.S.C. §§
1601(a), 1602, and 1606(c) (1994), respectively. See also supra note 12. Two documents
are required to be submitted by the President: a statement of policy at five year intervals that
frames budget requests for forest activities and a yearly budget explanation requesting
1996]
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Resources Planning Act, the Forest Service is required to prepare integrated
management plans for units of the National Forest System that conform to
the mandates of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Multiple-
Use Sustained-Yield Act.42 In 1976 several lawsuits challenging Forest
Service activities under the 1897 Organic Act threatened to curtail the
nation's supply of timber.43 Congress responded by enacting the National
Forest Management Act as an amendment to the Resources Planning Act.
Relying on the Resources Planning Act's strategic planning system as
the foundation, the National Forest Management Act focuses on providing
guidance for all forest management activities.' As described in the National
Forest Management Act, planning is "an open process to set goals for the
conditions of and outputs from the national forests, to identify standards and
guidelines for activities, and to describe the actions and funding needed to
achieve the goals."'45
Within Forest Service operations, the Organic Act46 and the Multiple-
Use Sustained-Yield Act provide the broad management framework while
the National Forest Management Act and the National Environmental Policy
Act guide local resource management and public participation. Congress
intended activities under the National Forest Management Act to be
compatible with the Resources Planning Act, the National Environmental
Policy Act, and the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act.47 Congress also
intended for the National Forest Management Act to balance use and
conservation of forest resources. 48  The Senate Committee Report to the
National Forest Management Act states that other forest resources, besides
timber, such as "wildlife and fish habitats, water, air, aesthetics, and
necessary funds to meet the goals contained in the statement of policy. 16 U.S.C. § 1606(a),
(b) (1994).
42. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1604(e), 1604(g) (1994).
43. The primary case held that clearcutting in the Monongahela National Forest in West
Virginia violated provisions of the 1897 Organic Act. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision and held that § 551 of the Organic
Act allowing the Forest Service to sell "dead, matured, or large growth of trees" that had
been "marked and designated" for sale did not authorize clearcutting of young (not fully
mature) trees. By affirming the injunction against clearcutting in the Monongahela Forest,
the court diminished the Forest Service's ability to use its preferred form of harvest. West
Virginia Div. of the Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 422, affid, 522 F.2d
945 (4th Cir. 1975).
44. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
45. OTA REPORT, supra note 24, at 49.
46. Although the Organic Act was repealed in 1976 by the National Forest Management
Act, it still plays a part in the posture and direction of the Forest Service operations.
47. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1604(e), 1604(g) (1994).
48. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, S. REP. NO. 893,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 278-362 (1976).
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wilderness . . . must be protected and improved. Consideration of these
resources is an integral part of the planning process."49 The National Forest
Management Act authorizes standards, considerations, and guidelines in
planning for the balanced management of the National Forests.5
Management planning under the National Forest Management Act is a
three step process. Planning regulations are first promulgated,5 local draft
plans are prepared in accordance with the regulations, 2 and the draft plans
are then revised at minimum intervals.5 3 The Forest Service is to utilize an
integrated approach in developing and maintaining the management plans.54
Although substantial discretion is left to the Forest Service, the National
Forest Management Act prescribes specifics for such priorities as providing
for a diversity of plant life,5 prohibiting irreversible soil and watershed
damage,56 protecting water resources, 7 limiting the size of clearcuts, "and
mandating a sustainable annual timber yield.5 9 Also, the plan must reflect
possible and proposed future activities. 60 Due to comprehensive planning
requirements of the National Forest Management Act, some have called it
the "new Organic Act" of the Forest Service.6' Essentially, the National
49. Id.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (1994).
52. Resource plan development is itself a three-stage process. Pertinent information,
such as resource inventories, is gathered; an integrated plan is created according to the
congressional mandates of public participation, multiple or dominant use, and the National
Environmental Policy Act; and finally the plan is implemented. WILKINSON & ANDERSON,
supra note 23, at 10.
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(5) (1994). Revision is to be made:
(A) from time to time when the Secretary finds conditions in a unit have
significantly changed, but at least every fifteen years, and (B) in accordance with
the provisions of subsections (e) and (f) of this section [which explain the
requirements of each plan including compliance with the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act] and public involvement comparable to that required by subsection (d)
of this section [providing for public participation in the development, review, and
revision of management plans].
Id.
The regulations also require revision if policies, goals, or objectives would have a
significant impact on forest projects. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(g) (1994).
54. Section 1604(b) requires that "the Secretary shall use a systematic interdisciplinary
approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical, biological, economic, and other
sciences." 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (1994). See also 36 C.F.R. § 219.5 (1994).
55. National Forest Management Act § 6(g)(3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (1994).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E) (1994).
57. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iii).
58. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(iv).
59. Id. § 1611(a).
60. Id. § 1604(f)(2).
61. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 46-51.
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Forest Management Act mandates a planning process establishing proce-
dural, as well substantive, standards and guidelines. It directs the Forest
Service in three primary ways. First, it requires development of long-term
integrated plans for each forest unit that will be amended at least every
fifteen years, or more often if needed. Second, it directs the promulgation
of regulations detailing the substantive directives for forest management.
Third, it provides for public involvement in the planning process.62
Perhaps the most undeveloped of these functions from the point of view
of standing is that of public involvement. Section 6 of the National Forest
Management Act commands the Secretary to provide for public participation
at all levels of forest planning: development, review, and revision. 63 The
ul -6-d ; , , - ,10.;€ - -I, 11-, 6 4 -- A - -,;A-,1 -r ,-WI
input in determining the purpose and needs of the local forest unit.65
Outlined by the regulations, the objectives of public participation are to
broaden the information base upon which land and resource management
planning decisions are made; ensure that the Forest Service understands the
needs, concerns, and values of the public; inform the public of Forest
Service activities; and provide the public with an understanding of Forest
Service programs and proposed activities.'
Participation of interested parties is a vital element of the intended
planning process. Nothing in the National Forest Management Act implies
that Congress expected this participation to end with the adoption of the
plan. However, by failing to supply a citizen's cause of action (or citizen
suit) provision, the National Forest Management Act does not explicitly give
the public the right to participate in the judicial review of forest plans.
Whether the detailed public involvement provisions in the statute and
regulations extend the public's opportunity to influence forest plans to the
judicial review stage is a question that, by default, has been left up to the
courts.
62. The issue of standing to challenge the plans to date has centered on the second
function. Most court challenges question the extent of these substantive guidelines.
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (1994). This section requires the Secretary to provide for
public participation in the development, review, and revision of land management plans
including but not limited to making the plans or revisions available to the public at
convenient locations in the vicinity of the affected unit for a period of at least three months
before final adoption, during which period the Secretary shall publicize and hold public
meetings or comparable processes at locations that foster public participation in the review
of such plans or revisions. Id.
64. 36 C.F.R. § 219.6 (1994).
65. Id. § 219.12(b). This provision states that "the interdisciplinary team shall identify
and evaluate public issues ... including those identified throughout the planning process
during public participation." Id.
66. 36 C.F.R. § 219.6(a)(1)-(4) (1994).
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III. STANDING TO SUE
The doctrine of standing to sue requires a party to have a "sufficient
stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of
that controversy."67 The United States Constitution limits federal courts to
adjudication of "cases" and "controversies.'68 The Constitution, however,
does not delineate the extent of the "cases and controversies" language. The
Supreme Court has developed a body of case law that defines standing as
required by the Constitution. Although not constitutionally required, courts
have created a second phase of policy-based standing that plaintiffs must
also satisfy, which is known as prudential standing.69 Prudential standing
is utilized to limit court dockets, reduce the scope of judicial review, and
give deference to agency actions. Plaintiffs, then, must overcome three
hurdles: standing as required by the Constitution, standing as required by
prudential concerns, and the issue of ripeness.
A. Constitutional Standing
Constitutional standing has a minimum of three elements.
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" .... Second,
there must be a [causal] connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of--the injury must be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant" ..... Third, it must be "likely," as
67. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (6th ed. 1990). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972).
68. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ci. 1. This provision states:
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; -to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
ministers and Consuls; -to all Cases of Admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; -to Controversies
between two or more States; -between a State and Citizens of another State; -
between Citizens of different States; -between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. (emphasis added).
69. One formula for standing which combines constitutional and prudential requirements
is as follows. There are four main features of standing which the plaintiff must allege: (1)
that the challenged injury will cause the plaintiff some actual or threatened injury in fact; (2)
that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; (3) that the injury is redressable
by judicial action; and (4) that the injury is to an interest arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected by the statute alleged to have been violated. ROBERT PERCIVAL ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 727 (1992). The first three
requirements are constitutional while the fourth is the primary prudential element. See infra
note 94 and accompanying text.
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opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. 70
1. Injury in Fact
The centerpiece of constitutional standing is the injury in fact
component.7 Environmental and aesthetic injuries are sufficient to satisfy
this requirement.72 Historically, plaintiffs had to plead economic or property
injury, but in 1970 the Supreme Court held that noneconomic injury could
form the basis for standing.73 The concept of "environmental standing" 7
originated in Sierra Club v. Morton," when the Court acknowledged that
environmental values could form the background for standing by recogniz-
ing that environmental well-being is an "important ingredient [in] the quality
of life" and the fact that environmental interests are shared by a large
number of people does not make "them less deserving of legal protection
through the judicial process. 76
The Court's interpretation of the injury in fact requirement has ebbed
and flowed from a high point in 197371 to what appears to be a low point
70. Lujan I, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
71. The courts have accepted three types of injury in fact: substantive, procedural (see
infra note 87), and informational (see infra note 88).
72. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
73. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
74. About the same time as judicial recognition of environmental interests evolved, the
legislature was incorporating citizen suits into new environmental statutes such as the Clean
Water Act and the Clean Air Act.
75. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Although it recognized environmental interests as valid for
review purposes, it required the plaintiffs to have actually used the area in question. Sierra
Club v. Morton was a case where the plaintiffs intended to test the limits of the Court's
recent switch from the "legal interest" test, to the two part test of injury in fact plus
consideration of whether the interest is within the zone of interests designed to be protected
by the underlying statute. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970). In an attempt to clarify the extent of standing for environmental organizations,
the Sierra Club simply pled that a large number of its members resided in the San Francisco
Bay area near a proposed ski resort in the Sierra Nevada Mountains of California and that
the Sierra Club had a "special interest" in conservation of national parks, forests, etc. Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734. The Court stated that a "special interest" in a problem or
the way in which that problem is resolved was insufficient to support standing. Id. at 739.
The Court required that there be "actual use" which was adversely affected. Id.
76. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734.
77. Perhaps the most relaxed view of the injury in fact requirement came in 1973 with
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). Though the plaintiffs were merely
representative of nationwide injury, the Court allowed standing when the plaintiffs alleged
that they would be harmed by the Interstate Commerce Commission's order approving a
2.5% surcharge on freight charges, on the ground that the surcharge discriminated against
recycled materials, encouraged consumption of natural resources, and therefore increased the
likelihood of litter. Id. The plaintiffs contended that this would cause adverse environmental
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in the 1990s.78 In 1990 the Supreme Court further restricted the limits of
standing and tightened the mandates of the injury in fact requirement.7 9 In
National Wildlife Federation v. Lujan (Lujan 1),80 the plaintiffs challenged
a Bureau of Land Management ad hoc program that reviewed land
withdrawal decisions. The plaintiffs claimed that the "program" violated the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the National Environmental
Policy Act.81 The National Wildlife Federation submitted an affidavit stating
that one of its members visited some areas affected by the Bureau of Land
Management's program. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims for lack
of standing. The Court's decision emphasized the need to show how
particular individuals are affected by the contested agency action. The
National Wildlife Federation's affidavit lacked sufficient specificity to
establish the injury in fact component.8 2 This holding requires plaintiffs to
plead, with heightened detail, a concrete injury from agency action in the
contested area that is frequented by the members of the representative
81organization.
effects to the plaintiffs' recreational use of forests, streams, etc., surrounding the Washington
metropolitan area.
78. Subsequent decisions after SCRAP have indicated that the Court is retreating from
that expansive and attenuated view of standing. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984);
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464 (1982); Simon v. EKWRO, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975).
79. Lujan 4 497 U.S. at 871. Despite a fairly liberal use of standing by the lower
courts, the Supreme Court began a restrictive mode of interpretation for challengers under
the federal environmental statutes. Randall Abate & Michael Meyers, Broadening the Scope
of Environmental Standing: Procedural and Informational Injury in Fact After Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 345, 346 (1994).
80. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
81. This action was brought under the Administrative Procedure Act because neither the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act nor the National Environmental Policy Act create
private causes of action through citizen suit provisions.
82. The Bureau program and the two actions under attack that allegedly caused the
plaintiffs' "injury" revoked withdrawals on two tracts of land: 4500 acres within a 2 million
acre area and approximately 1.8 million acres of a 5.5 million acre parcel were left open to
mining, and therefore were no longer withdrawn from development. The affidavits did not
establish that these revocations of withdrawals would harm the plaintiffs, who alleged that
two of their members used the lands in the "vicinity" of the revocations.
83. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 888. This decision also rested on other standing issues arising
under the Administrative Procedure Act that will be discussed below in the context of the
prudential standing requirement of zone of interest. This case is important because it
clarified Sierra Club v. Morton's scope of environmental standing to ensure that the plaintiffs
themselves suffer the recreational or aesthetic injury, and to require a much more specific
fact allegation by the injured party. As one commentator put it, the holding made sure the
plaintiffs were not just "officious intermeddlers." William Funk, Standing Issues in
Environmental Cases, Address Before the Environmental and Natural Resources Law Seminar
(1993) in Federal Judicial Center and Northwestern School of Law Manual, 1993, at 3.
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The Supreme Court's trend toward increasing the plaintiffs standing
burden continued in 1992 with the Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife (Lujan II)." This case increased the fact-pleading responsibilities
of the plaintiff and further curtailed the interpretation of injury in fact. The
majority held that a plaintiff must show "an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical."85 Imminence of harm must be specifically
established by the submitted affidavits of the party.86 This appears to mean
that plaintiffs must state the exact times when they or their members use or
expect to use the specific areas in question. The Court also stated that
procedural injury alone would not support a finding of standing.87 Instead,
a procedural interest equates to standing only when agency disregard of the
procedure at issue would result in a separate substantive injury.88
Another form of standing that frequently arises in environmental cases is organizational
standing. When an organization brings suit as a representative of its members, it must show
that the organization's members would themselves have standing to sue by meeting the
constitutional and prudential requirements, and that the interests the organization seeks to
protect are "germane to the organization's purposes." See Automobile Workers v. Brock,
477 U.S. 274 (1986).
84. Lujan 11, 504 U.S. at 555. In this case, the plaintiffs challenged a Department of
Interior regulation requiring Endangered Species Act consultation by agencies only if the
action occurred in the United States or on the high seas. Id. at 558. The plaintiffs' affidavits
described how two of its members had traveled to foreign countries (Sri Lanka and Egypt)
to see endangered species in their native habitat. Id. at 563. The plaintiffs alleged that these
species would be harmed by U.S. Agency for International Development projects unless
consultation between the agencies was required. Id. at 566. The plaintiffs' affidavits
indicated that they may visit those areas again "sometime in the fiture." Id. at 564. This
possibility of future harm was not concrete enough to establish injury in fact. Id. at 578.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Procedural rights arise when the public is granted the opportunity to participate in
an agency action or process by receiving notice and having an opportunity to comment.
Therefore, a procedural injury occurs through the interference with this right. However, in
Lujan II the plaintiff's procedural injury was one suffered by the public as a whole. Even
though the Endangered Species Act allows "any person" to sue to enforce its mandates, the
consultation requirement's process does not involve the public directly---although it certainly
was intended to benefit the public indirectly. The Lujan II court required that the procedural
interest be supported by an underlying substantive right that would be impaired by the
agency's failure to comply with procedure. This rule was not satisfied by the broad "whole
world" procedural violation alleged by the plaintiffs.
88. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 576. For the view that procedural injury offers a promising
mechanism for redressing environmental harms, see Abate & Meyers, supra note 79 and
Teresa B. Salamone, How Footnote 7 in Lujan H May Expand Standing for Procedural
Injuries, 9 NAT. RES. J. 75 (Winter 1995).
This holding in Lujan 11 also seems to eliminate "informational standing" as a viable
form of procedural injury. Informational injury is alleged by organizations who base part of
their mission on the ability to disseminate information to their members. This interest in
obtaining and providing information is claimed to be impaired when an agency does not
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2. Causation/Traceability and Redressability
Causation addresses the question of whether the injury a plaintiff
complains of has been caused by or can be fairly traced to the conduct of
the defendant. In other words, this component asks whether the "line of
causation between the . . . conduct and [the] injury [is] too attenuated."89
Redressability is the third element, and it is closely related to causation.90
Redressability inquires into whether the "prospect of obtaining relief
from the jury as a result of a favorable decision is too speculative."9'
Essentially, the court must be able to offer the plaintiffs a satisfactory
resolution to the injury suffered.92 Redressability is interrelated with the first
two requirements. Unless the plaintiffs suffer actual injury that is caused by
the defendant, the court's remedy would not redress the plaintiffs' harm.93
B. Prudential Standing
Once a court finds that a party has satisfied the threshold tests of
constitutional standing, the court must then determine if the prudential
standing elements are present.94 Prudential restrictions require that the
follow informational procedures such as preparation of an environmental impact statement.
89. Allen v. Wright, 466 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
90. Id. Distinguishing between tracebility and redressability, the Court in Allen
recognized that "there is a difference, that the former examines the causal connection
between the asserted unlawful conduct and the alleged injury, whereas the latter examines
the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested." Id. at 753
n.19.
91. Id.
92. The statements made by the Court in Lujan II concerning redressability of
generalized government action is of particular importance to resource planning litigation. In
holding that the plaintiffs did not meet the redressability component, the Court stated, "suits
challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular
programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations ... [are], even when premised
on allegations of several instances of violations of law, . . . rarely if ever appropriate for
federal-court adjudication." Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 568 (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 759-60).
Note, however, that forest plans are required by the National Forest Management Act to be
prepared and do not necessarily fall within the Court's characterization of "programs...
establish[ed] to carry out their legal obligations," which seems to refer to agency programs
and systems created to fulfill their statutory duties.
93. Colhoun and Hamill explain this way: "Redressability relies on both injury in fact
and causal connection: If an actual injury does not exist, it would not be redressable.
Similarly, if the causal connection does not exist, the requested relief would not redress the
conduct complained of." Martha Colhoun and Timothy S. Hamill, Environmental Standing
in the Ninth Circuit: Wading Through the Quagmire, 15 PUB. LAND L. REv. 249, 262 (1994).
94. Prudential requirements are based in policy rather than in "purely constitutional
considerations." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).
Generally, although courts have not strictly followed this rule, prudential requirements
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plaintiffs injury fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute
under which the plaintiff's claim arises," involve the party personally,96 and
does not amount to a "generalized grievance." '97 Obviously, these compo-
nents are very similar to the constitutional requirements, and courts have
often confused the. limit and application of each. Courts frequently combine
constitutional analysis with prudential analysis or call their inquiry into
statutory requirements "prudential standing." For the sake of simplicity,
only the zone of interest element will be discussed, as the remaining two
requirements are fairly self-explanatory.9"
In a world where the courts do not confuse the principles of constitu-
tional and prudential standing, three broad contexts for standing exist. First,
in cases where no citizen suit provision applies, constitutional and prudential
standing requirements are examined. Second, cases can be brought under
the Administrative Procedure Act to address agency action under a statute
that does not otherwise provide for citizen initiated judicial review. Finally,
where a statutory citizen suit provision is available, both constitutional and
statutory requirements must be met. When determining standing under a
statute with a citizen suit clause, the court should look for satisfaction of the
elements Congress defined as that statute's standard of review. If, however,
the suit is brought under a statute without such a provision, the analysis
should fall back on prudential requirements.
This dichotomy is complicated in situations where the plaintiff alleges
procedural injury from an agency action under the Administrative Procedure
Act. For example, in forest plan litigation, plaintiffs frequently allege injury
under the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Forest
Management Act. Neither statute provides a private right of action for
violation of its provisions. Challengers must therefore bring suit pursuant
to section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. This section states
that "a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the relevant
are not applicable if Congress has expressed an intent to eliminate the restrictions by creating
citizen suit provisions in the statute. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 156-57 (1970). Theoretically, the plaintiffs would have to show only
satisfaction of the constitutional elements, and that their interests fall within those intended
to be protected by the statute under which the plaintiffs bring the claim.
95. See Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 882-83.
96. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
97. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 573-78.
98. The zone of interest concept, as will be discussed, is one part of the Administrative
Procedure Act's statutory standing requirements. It was first intended only in that context,
not as a prudential component, but courts began to apply the zone of interest review in both
Administrative Procedure Act and non-Administrative Procedure Act cases, as a prudential
restriction. See Coihoun & Hamill, supra note 93, at 264.
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statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."" Thus, prudential standing is
converted back to statutory standing because the underlying statutory
provisions form the basis for standing. For all meaningful purposes in
resource plan litigation, satisfaction of the Administrative Procedure Act
standard substitutes for the prudential standing examination."0
The two essential elements of the Administrative Procedure Act's
standing provision are agency action and zone of interest. The plaintiff
must first establish that he or she has been harmed by an agency action.
Agency action is defined as "the whole or part of an agency rule, order,
license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to
act."'' If the plaintiff is seeking judicial review pursuant to the general
review provision of Administrative Procedure Act section 10(a), as opposed
to the specific provisions of the underlying statute, the alleged agency action
must be "final."' 2 This requirement comes from the language of Adminis-
trative Procedure Act section 704: "agency action made reviewable by
statute andfinal agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy
in a court are subject to judicial review."'0 3
Under the second prong, zone of interests, a plaintiff must show that
his or her injury was either a legal wrong or an aggrievement caused by the
final action."' 4 Whether a plaintiff has suffered a legal wrong or an
aggrievement is determined within the meaning of the underlying statute that
forms the basis for the plaintiff's complaint. In other words, the injury must
fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statutory
99. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
100. The zone of interest test is a component of the Administrative Procedure Act
standard. Therefore, that element of prudential standing will be evaluated in the context of
the Administrative Procedure Act.
101. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1994). Several creative arguments against standing have been
made in forest plan cases. In one case, the Forest Service argued that the forest plans,
throughout their duration, were not an ongoing agency action but were so only at the time
of adoption or upon revision or amendment. Calling this argument incorrect, the Ninth
Circuit rejected it by determining that "the [management plans] have an ongoing and long-
lasting effect even after adoption, [thus] we hold that the [management plans] represent
ongoing agency action." Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.
1994).
102. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. 546, 552 (W.D. Ark. 1994), (citing Lujan
1, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)) rev'd in part, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1793 (1995). Final agency action is closely related to the ripeness inquiry because the
agency action will not be "ripe" for review under the Administrative Procedure Act until it
is "final." A court may decide the final agency action and zone of interest elements in its
discussion of ripeness. Id.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994) (emphasis added). The Administrative Procedure Act does
not define "final agency action" and courts have been challenged to define it.
104. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. at 552.
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provision at issue." 5 This test is intended to distinguish between cases that
are "more likely to frustrate than further statutory objectives."10 6 The zone
of interests protected under the National Environmental Policy Act include
recreational, environmental, and aesthetic concerns.'0 7 Economic concerns
have been found to fall outside the scope of the National Environmental
Policy Act.'0 8 The National Forest Management Act provides for several
interests including timber, recreation, watershed, and wilderness usage."
C. Ripeness
Ripeness is simply another justiciability concept that has an intertwined
role in reso plan litigation. To gain judicial review, a claim must be
sufficiently mature so that it is considered a "controversy" as required by
Article III of the Constitution. This requirement prevents the courts from
reviewing hypothetical issues that have not ripened into actual, present
controversies. In summary:
[the] basic rationale of "ripeness doctrine" arising out of [a] court's
reluctance to apply declaratory judgment and injunctive remedies unless
administrative determinations arise in context of a controversy ripe for
judicial resolution, is to prevent courts, through avoidance of premature
105. There has been some confusion in the application of the zone of interest test. This
test was originally intended to grant review in Administrative Procedure Act cases only.
Courts, however, began to apply it as a general prudential requirement. See Colhoun &
Hamill, supra note 93, at 265. By evaluating and adjusting its future application, the
Supreme Court, in Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 394-403 (1987), refined
the zone of interest test by expressing that the plaintiffs claim should be denied only if his
or her "interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the
statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit."
Colhoun & Hamill, supra note 93, at 399.
106. Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 715 (1987)
(citing Clarke, 479 U.S. at 394-403).
107. See Lujan I, 479 U.S. at 885-86.
108. Several courts have held that plaintiffs who assert purely economic injury do not
have standing to challenge agency action under the National Environmental Policy Act. See
Churchill Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 533 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1976); Clinton
Community Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Md. Medical Ctr., 510 F.2d 1037, 1038 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975); Nevada Land Action Ass'n, 8 F.3d at 713. Finding that
the National Environmental Policy Act was "not designed to prevent loss of profits but was
intended to promote general awareness of and action concerning environmental problems,"
the Eighth Circuit rejected a plaintiff's alleged economic injury by determining that
"petitioners whose sole motivation in this case was their own economic self-interest and
welfare, are singularly inappropriate parties to be entrusted with the responsibility of asserting
the public's environmental interest in [these] proceedings." Churchill Truck Lines, 533 F.2d
at 416.
109. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e) (1994).
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adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties, and [a] court is
required to evaluate both fitness of issues for judicial decision and
hardship to parties of withholding court consideration."'
Ripeness is a timing principle that is closely related to the "final agency
action" requirement in the Administrative Procedure Act standing test."' In
the context of agency action, the ripeness doctrine requires that the claim
come only after a "final" agency action. Thus, for forest plans, the issue is
at what point the Forest Service's action is considered "final," the manage-
ment plan stage or the project/on-the-ground activity stage. Courts,
specifically the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, have answered this question
differently.
IV. THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE CIRCUITS
As noted throughout the above discussion, the courts have not been
consistent in their application of the standing and ripeness doctrines. The
divergent opinions of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits regarding the ability of
plaintiffs to challenge national forest management plans are characteristic of
this inconsistency. These circuits answer two crucial questions differently.
The first issue is determining what Lujan I (National Wildlife) and
Lujan I (Defenders) require for plaintiffs to establish standing. The second
issue concerns the nature and actionability of a forest plan. These two
issues are interrelated. The Eighth Circuit held that because forest plans are
only a management tool, plaintiffs can suffer no injury in fact under the
requirements of the Supreme Court cases."2 The Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, has held that the plans play an important if not critical role in forest
management and, to the extent that they "predetermine the future, [they]
represent[] a concrete injury that plaintiffs must . . . have standing to
110. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1891 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967)).
111. Ripeness occasionally centers around the "label" the court or agency puts on the
challenged activity. If an agency calls its activity something other than what is required to
trigger judicial review, such as "program" or "recommendation" or "report" as opposed to
"actions" or "proposals" in the National Environmental Policy Act context, those activities
may escape review because the court does not find them "final" and therefore ripe. See
Bridget A. Hust, Ripeness Doctrine in NEPA Cases: A Rotten Jurisdictional Barrier, 11 LAW
& INEQ. J. 505 (1993).
112. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994).
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challenge."" 3 The Ninth Circuit affirms this holding to be valid in light of
the Lujan Supreme Court cases.' The consequences of this split affect at
least three aspects of a plaintiff's case: the specificity of facts pled, the
timing of the challenge, and the basis of the challenge. Other courts have
taken up these issues, but this article will only discuss the holdings of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, as these are representative of the two positions
the federal courts have adopted regarding standing."5
A. The Eighth Circuit: Sierra Club v. Robertson
Recently the Eighth Circuit decided Sierra Club v. Robertson,"6
apparently the first case to be brought before that t ch•allenging a frst
plan as a whole. In addition to the Sierra Club, other plaintiffs were the
defenders of the Ouachita Forest, several individuals, and the State of
Arkansas as an intervenor. These parties brought suit against the Forest
Service and timber industry intervenors for the management and planning
of the Ouachita National Forest. The plaintiffs sought judicial review at two
levels of planning for the forest, the forest plan level and the site-specific
timber sale level. The plaintiffs alleged that the amended management plan
violated the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, the
National Forest Management Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act.
113. Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Idaho
Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1516 (9th Cir. 1992)).
114. Id.
115. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Sierra Club v.
Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995), affirmed a district court opinion granting standing to
users of the National Forest in a challenge to a management plan's adequacy as to
incorporation of conservation biology, providing recreational opportunities, and to the
environmental impact statement's range of alternatives. The district court rejected the Forest
Service's argument that the plaintiffs' anticipated injury was with the implementation of the
plan, not the plan itself because under that reasoning the plaintiffs would have to wait until
specific activities were proposed. The district court stated that, although the plan sets
guidelines and parameters, it also establishes detailed "prescriptions that are in no sense
conditional or optional." Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp. 1526, 1530 (E.D. Wis. 1994),
affd, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995). Further, the district court noted that "because the current
plan mandates, in quite specific terms, the very management activity that will ultimately
cause plaintiffs' injury, the fact that the [Forest] Service has yet actually to inflict the injury
through development of site-specific projects, does not render the injury 'conjectural' or
'speculative' and therefore does not deprive plaintiffs of standing to challenge the plan." Id.
at 1531. The Seventh Circuit reiterated the point by quoting the district court's above
statement. Marita, 46 F.3d at 611-12. See also Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Thompson, 811 F. Supp. 635 (D. Utah 1993); Wind River Multiple-Use Advocates v. Espy,
835 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Wyo. 1993); Sierra Club v. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Colo.
1990); Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989);
Intermountain Forest Indus. Ass'n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Wyo. 1988).
116. 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994).
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They also alleged that the final environmental impact statement that was
prepared in conjunction with the management plan and record of decision
was inadequate. The plaintiffs further alleged that two specific timber sale
decisions violated both the National Environmental Policy Act and the
National Forest Management Act."
17
The district court denied a preliminary injunction barring the two
sales."' The district court had previously held that the environmental
groups had standing to challenge the Forest Service's decisions regarding
timber sales and adoption of the plan and that the decisions were final
agency actions overcoming the ripeness barrier." 9 Eventually, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the
plan satisfied both the National Forest Management Act and the National
Environmental Policy Act.20 The Sierra Club then appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit affirmed
the grant of summary judgment but reversed the district court's finding of
standing.' 2'
The district court's well-reasoned opinion is in stark contrast to the
Eighth Circuit's brief and conclusory decision. The district court opinion
began its standing analysis by reviewing the constitutional requirements.
122
At the time of the opinion, the Supreme Court had not decided Lujan IT As
to injury in fact, the district court refused to accept the defendants' view that
the management plan was only a "programmatic statement of intent." The
district court stated that the standing inquiry directly connects to the
determination of whether the plan is a "final agency action" for purposes of
the Administrative Procedure Act. 23 The district court confused the injury
in fact, prudential, and ripeness requirements.
Continuing with the constitutional components, the district court found
both causation, because the management plan designated specific areas
suitable for timber as well as methods of production, and redressability. 1
24
Next the district court reviewed statutory standing under the Administrative
117. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. 546, 547 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (granting
motion to dismiss, in part, and denying, in part, finding plaintiffs to have standing).
118. Id. at 593 (denying motion for preliminary injunction).
119. Id. at 555.
120. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 810 F. Supp. at 1021 (granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment).
121. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994).
122. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. 546, 550 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
123. Id. at 550.
124. Id. The court stated that a favorable decision would satisfy plaintiffs' request for
review because the Forest Service would be forced to establish reasonable methods of
accounting for diversity (a requirement of the National Forest Management Act that the
plaintiffs alleged the defendant agency violated). Id.
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Procedure Act. The court defined and explained the two part test of final
agency action and zone of interests. 25 Finding that the plaintiffs' interests
are definitely protected by the National Environmental Policy Act and the
National Forest Management Act, the zone of interest test was satisfied.'26
The court addressed the "final agency action" element in its discussion
of ripeness. Paraphrasing the defendants' arguments that the adoption of the
land resource management plan is not a final agency action, the court stated:
"Rhetoric aside, the defendants essentially base ... their [argument] on the
assertion that the [management plan] and [environmental impact statement]
are of so little import that their approval can neither injure the plaintiffs nor
be described as any sort of action."' 12' The court rejected this argument,
distinguishing Lujan I on the basis that the Supreme Court in that case was
not reviewing an actual and integrated program mandated by a statute.
28
The court further determined that the management plan had specific
directions as to how management decisions are to be made including, in the
context of the vegetation management plan, what tools and methods are
allowed, the frequency of treatment, and mitigation methods that may be
used in future site-specific decisions. 129 The court noted that the manage-
ment plan is a "final plan, and no other management guidelines for the
forest as a whole need come now."' 30  In summary, the district court
concluded that "the Supreme Court in Lujan [I] clearly did not intend to
preclude review of a plan simply because a project level decision .. had
not been made.'131
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit also started its analysis with a discussion
of constitutional standing, quoting from the then recently decided Lujan H
(Defenders of Wildlife) case. 32  Although the court acknowledged that
environmental harms could be sufficient to confer standing, 133 it emphasized
that the plaintiffs had not asserted an injury that was "certainly impending,"
thereby failing to meet the Article III injury in fact test." 4 The court made
several broad statements concerning the nature of a forest plan, assuming the
plan's adoption could not inflict injury because it "does not effectuate any
125. Id. at 552.
126. Id.
127. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp at 553.
128. Id. at 553-54.
129. Id. at 554.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
133. Id. at 758 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)).
134. Id. at 758 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
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on-the-ground environmental changes." 135 Calling the management plan a
"general planning tool,' 136 the court first required a site-specific action to be
proposed and found consistent with the plan before review could be made,
lest the court move into an area of "speculation and conjecture."'' 37
The court flatly refused to accept the series of Ninth Circuit cases that
entertained challenges to similar forest plans. Specifically, the court found
it hard to determine the "concrete" and "particularized" injury upon which
the holdings must have been based, assuming the Ninth Circuit decisions
were intended to be in conformity with the Lujan cases. The Ninth Circuit,
however, in Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 31 made the grant of standing in
light of the two Lujan cases, determining that its decision was both
consistent and appropriate given the facts of the Resources case.
B. The Ninth Circuit: Resources Ltd. v. Robertson
Continuing a line of cases that grant standing to forest plan challenges,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Resources
reflected upon its recent decisions and their relation to the Lujan cases. For
this reason, Resources was chosen as the representative case of Ninth Circuit
reasoning concerning standing. In that case the plaintiffs, several environ-
mental groups, asserted that the defendant Forest Service violated the
National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest Management Act,
and the Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs also challenged the Flathead
National Forest management plan and its related forest-wide environmental
impact statement.'39 The plaintiffs claimed that the Forest Service's decision
that the management plan's adoption would not harm endangered and
threatened species was arbitrary and capricious and that the related
environmental impact statement was inadequate. 40 The district court held
that the plaintiffs lacked standing and the issue was not ripe for review,
following similar arguments as the Eighth Circuit and relying upon an
earlier case from the same district court that was eventually reversed by the
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Sierra Club v. Robertson 28 F.3d at 758 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
497 (1974)).
138. 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1994).
139. Id.
140. An environmental impact statement should not be set aside absent a showing of
arbitrary and capricious agency action. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490
U.S. 360 (1989). The Ninth Circuit reviews agency decisions not to prepare such a statement
under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Friends of the Payette v. Horseshoe Bend
Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Ninth Circuit. 4 ' The court, therefore, granted summary judgment for the
defendants on all counts.1
42
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit
issued a threefold decision, reversing the district court's findings as to
standing and ripeness, affirming that the environmental impact statement
was adequate, and finding that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when the agency concluded the plan to allow logging in the
forest would not harm endangered and threatened species, thereby reversing
the district court's grant of summary judgment on that issue.'4 3 The holding
of the district court as compared to the appellate court in Resources is nearly
the exact reverse of Sierra Club v. Robertson. Interestingly, so are the
reasonings of the appellate courts.
As is customary in standing analyses, the Resources court started with
the issue of constitutional standing, quoting Lujan H's three-part test." It
then directed its attention to the district court's finding that the plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the injury in fact requirement. Because the district court
relied upon its previous decision in Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma
145
that was reversed upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit court reiterated its rationale
behind that reversal. 46 In the Mumma appeal,'47 the court had recognized
the importance of the plan decision. Basing its determination on the
perceived intention of Congress, the Resources court found constitutional
standing had been fulfilled and repeated several observations made in
Mumma.' 4  The court reiterated that unless it is assumed that Congress
intended to create useless procedural safeguards in the National Forest
Management Act, the plan plays "some, if not a critical, part in subsequent
decisions."'4 9 The court also repeated that unless plaintiffs may challenge
the forest-wide environmental impact statement, the plan itself may forever
escape review,150 and "to the extent that the plan pre-determines the future,
it represents a concrete injury that plaintiffs must, at some point, have
standing to challenge.''. The district court in Sierra Club v. Robertson
expressed a concern similar to the Ninth Circuit that some maneuvering on
141. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,666 (D. Mont. 1990),
rev'd, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992).
142. Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d at 1397.
143. Id. at 1402.
144. Id. at 1397.
145. 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,666 (D. Mont. 1990), rev'd, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992).
146. Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d at 1397.
147. 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992).
148. Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d at 1397.
149. Id. (citing Mumma, 956 F.2d at 1516).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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the part of the Forest Service, namely the sporadic withdrawal of challenged
timber sales, could insulate the agency's activities from review."'
The court rejected the Forest Service's argument that the Mumma
decision was invalid after the Lujan decisions."' In fact, the Ninth Circuit
had just decided two more cases, in light of Lujan I and Lujan II, that
reaffirmed Mumma's continuing validity. Those cases were Seattle Audubon
Society v. Espy1 4 and Portland Audubon Society v. Babbitt. "' The court
cited these cases and their rationale as evidence that their reasoning was not
in conflict with Lujan I and Lujan II.156 In a footnote, the court reiterated
that a person can enforce his or her procedural rights."' This rule was not
altered by Lujan H as long as the procedural rights were intended by
Congress to protect against some threatened concrete injury, for instance,
that the person is harmed by the underlying government action and not
merely by a procedural violation.'58 The Ninth Circuit further recognized
that Congress has acknowledged the procedural harm alleged by the
plaintiffs, by imposing the National Environmental Policy Act requirements
on planning activities.'59 In Resources and other similarly decided Ninth
Circuit cases, the affidavits satisfied the heightened fact pleading require-
ments of Lujan I and Lujan II, thus reinforcing the Ninth Circuit's analysis
of the Lujan cases. 160
Expressly rejecting the argument that the plaintiffs must wait for a
specific timber sale to be proposed, the court held that the plaintiffs' claim
was ripe for review.'16  Citing Espy, the court affirmatively acknowledged
that certain timber sales are "driven" by the underlying management plans. 62
Therefore, there was no need to wait for specific project proposals to invoke
judicial review because in some measure the plans "pre-determine" the
future 163 and represent final agency action.
Likewise in Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson,'64 the Ninth
Circuit granted standing and ripeness based instead upon the Administrative
152. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. at 554.
153. Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d at 1397.
154. 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993).
155. 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993).
156. Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d at 1398.
157. Id. at 1397-98 n.2.
158. See Espy, 998 F.2d at 703.
159. Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d at 1397-98 n.2.
160. In Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, the plaintiffs filed affidavits detailing their
members' regular and recreational uses in a large area of the Flathead Forest. Id. at 1398.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 32 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Procedure Act test. The court found that the minimum Article III require-
ments had been met. 65 In addition, the court held that the statutory
elements, "final agency action" and "zone of interest," (though different
from constitutional standing, but related to ripeness), were also satisfied by
the plaintiffs' claimed injury of an inadequate environmental impact
statement prepared for a forest herbicide program. "'66 The court stated that
it had previously held that when a party's complaint is with an overall forest
plan or program, the party does not have to wait to challenge a specific
project. 167
V. SHOULD THERE BE FOREST PLAN STANDING?
Opponents of allowing parties to challenge forest plans, namely the
Forest Service and other land management agencies, insist that the plans are
nothing more than broad statements of intent and outlines of principles that
the forest managers may consider when making on-the-ground decisions.
Their arguments can be grouped into three categories: those based on the
perceived nature of forest plans, those citing the recent Supreme Court
decisions and the traditional standing doctrine, and those founded on policy
considerations.
In the first category, it is argued that plans only suggest standards and
guidelines for management. The forest supervisors are not bound by the
plan and may change and amend it if the need arises. 168 In other words, the
plan does not dictate ground level activities and decisions with absolute
certainty. Due to intervening circumstances, the standards of the plan can
be altered. These circumstances may include budget cuts, plan amendments,
litigation, and adoption of regional Resources Planning Act timber harvest
targets. Because the forest plan standards are frequently changed, the
challenging party's injury is rendered conjectural and hypothetical.
Supporting this argument is the fact that each site-specific project requires
its own environmental assessment, potentially an environmental impact
statement, and a record of decision.
69
165. Id. at 1353 (quoting Lujan I1, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
166. Id. at 1354.
167. Id.
168. Section 1604 of the National Forest Management Act states that plans are to be
revised occasionally if the Secretary determines that significant changes in the conditions of
the forest so warrant. The regulations echo this requirement but add that plans may also be
revised when "changes in [Planning Act] policies, goals, or objectives would have a
significant effect on forest level programs." 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(g) (1994). See supra note
53.
169. See supra note 13.
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In response to these arguments, it should be pointed out that it is the
intent of Congress and the agency for the plans to determine how the federal
lands are to be managed. 7 ° First, consistency of on-the-ground projects with
the relevant forest plan is required by the National Forest Management Act,
the Forest Service regulations, and by the agency's administrative rules.
The National Forest Management Act requires "[r]esource plans and permits,
contracts, and other instruments for the use and occupancy of the National
Forest System [to] be consistent with the land management plans."'' Forest
Service regulations reiterate this intent by requiring all administrative
activities affecting the unit, such as budget proposals, to be based upon the
plan. ' Further, the Forest Service Land and Resource Management
Planning Handbook directs the agency to "make site specific decisions based
on the Forest Plan direction."'73
Second, several statutory obligations are triggered if an agency
determines that its action will have an on-the-ground impact. For example,
the Endangered Species Act demands consultation with the Fish and
Wildlife Service if an agency decides its action "may affect" a listed
species.'74 If the Forest Service has abided by these obligations and found
impact from its plan adoption or implementation, then the agency itself is
acknowledging that the plan "affects" the forest environment and its site-
level management.
The third and potentially most important counter-argument focuses on
the intent of Congress. The Arkansas district court and the Ninth Circuit
both implicitly accepted this argument by finding forest plans to be more
than useless procedural safeguards. Asserting that forest plans mean nothing
to specific activities ignores the intent of Congress and assumes Congress
meant to create an exercise in futility by establishing the huge, time-
consuming, and expensive forest planning process. Congress intended to
influence local forest management activities and chose the planning process
as the means to effectuate its objectives expressed in the National Forest
170. The regulations implementing the National Forest Management Act state that:
"Plans guide all natural resource management activities and establish management standards
and guidelines for the National Forest System. They determine resource management.
practices, levels of resource production and management, and the availability of lands for
resource management." 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b) (1994).
171. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (1994).
172. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e) (1994).
173. FOREST SERVICE, DEP'T OF AGRIC., LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANNING
HANDBOOK, ch. 53.
174. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (1994).
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Management Act. This intent is especially apparent given the circumstances
in which the Act was enacted.'75
A second category of arguments advocating denial of standing
concentrates on the demands of the Lujan cases and traditional standing
analysis. In addition to the injury in fact arguments already discussed in
Part III, the injury of forest plan plaintiffs may be too remote and attenuated
to be fairly traceable to the act of adoption of the forest plan in question.
This line of argument is fact dependent and varies in success depending
upon the statutory violation that is alleged. In Sierra Club v. Robertson, the
plaintiffs claimed that the plan was arbitrary and capricious, thus violating
certain provisions of the National Forest Management Act, including the
requirement of an integrated p!an.t 76  These allegations do not lend
themselves readily to a finding of causation. Connection of the indirect
effects of large scale actions, such as a forest plan to the injuries of
particular persons, is tenuous at best.177 Whether the lack of an integrated
plan could be directly linked to any harm claimed by the plaintiffs is
speculative.
For example, in Resources the alleged violations of the Endangered
Species Act could be traced more readily to the adoption decision of the
Forest Service, according to the Ninth Circuit.'78 In Resources, the plan
designated specific management areas with each emphasizing a certain
resource, such as timber harvest or grizzly bear habitat, and limited the types
of management activities within its boundaries. The plaintiffs alleged that
because grizzly bears do not recognize discrete management areas as the
limits of their habitat, the bears, as a listed species, could be harmed by the
management area designation and resulting management activities prescribed
by the plan. Therefore, the plaintiffs would be injured as well. Impacting
a listed species is a violation of the Endangered Species Act. Although the
Ninth Circuit found this to be sufficient injury for standing purposes, it is
175. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
176. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994).
177. Professor William Funk of Northwestern School of Law at Lewis & Clark College
explains that:
Large scale actions may "harm" the species or ecosystem, but will it in fact result
in reduced ability to enjoy the species or ecosystem[?] If there are still thousands
of spotted owls to be seen in the area frequented by the plaintiffs, does the fact
that the species has been further "threatened" actually injure [the] plaintiffs[?]
William Funk, Standing Issues in Environmental Cases, Address Before the Environmental
and Natural Resources Law Seminar (1993), in Federal Judicial Center and Northwestern
School of Law Manual, 1993, at 10-11. Professor Funk believes there is abundant language
in Lujan H to suggest that this type of effect does not "injure" the plaintiffs. Id.
178. Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1994).
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unclear whether such a reading is consistent with Lujan IV.79
Another fact-related argument is that the Lujan cases place on plaintiffs
stricter pleading requirements to establish with heightened specificity their
alleged injury. This hurdle may be hard, if not impossible, to overcome in
a plan challenge. The plaintiffs may be expected to show the precise
location and dates that they used the forest. The response of standing
proponents should be that with the right facts, this would not be an extra
burden. It is merely an issue of sufficiency of the facts pled."8 °
Numerous policy-laden arguments, the third class of arguments against
standing, can be made by proponents of standing as well as opponents. The
Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had to delay their challenge until a
site-specific decision, such as timber sales or vegetation treatment, was
made. 8' This deferral would not only avoid presenting abstract questions
to the court, but would also allow judicial review to occur on a more
controllable level. The facts of the decision would be more detailed and less
open to dispute. Delay in review would also eliminate the chance that
courts would be required to issue advisory opinions on provisions of the
plan which are not yet implemented.
In response, the plaintiffs, the Arkansas district court, and the Ninth
Circuit argue for a form of judicial efficiency. If several actions threaten
harm, it is much less costly and more efficient simply to challenge the plan
as a whole rather than repeatedly sue over each activity. Similarly, if the
court requires a deferral, the plaintiff would be denied the review of the
management plan's validity and would be put in the "unhappy, not to
mention costly, position of being required to file numerous complaints
before getting to the stage where judicial review could be granted."'8 2
Furthermore, the planning process envisioned by Congress encouraged
public involvement and was not intended to be insulated from review.8 3 If
a court insists upon delay in challenging a plan until implementation, broad
mandates and standards in the plan could forever escape review. Likewise,
under a deferral policy, the Forest Service may evade review of some of its
activities by issuing a decision, upholding it on administrative appeal, then
withdrawing it when a plaintiff files a lawsuit.'
179. See supra note 177.
180. See infra part VI.A.
181. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994).
182. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. 546, 554-55 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
183. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (1994). See also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
184. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. at 554.
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Perhaps the most persuasive justification for review is the resource
efficiency argument. A plan challenger put it best:
the agency has ... spent hundreds of millions of dollars and countless
employee hours on this planning effort. Planning participants, Forest
Service employees, and taxpayers alike must be quite chagrined to learn
that, after huge expenditures of time, money, and effort, the Forest
Service views forest plans as having merely an "extremely conjectural"
influence over subsequent forest management activities.8'
One commentator estimated that over $1 billion has been spent in a
process which took over ten years to complete."8 6 This rationale is
strengthened by the related arguments of congressional intent and judicial
efficiency. As noted earlier, if Congress created the planning process with
no expectation of impacting on-the-ground activities, then it created nothing
more than a huge waste of taxpayers' money. Also, if the plan and its
authorizing mandates are incapable of review, more waste of public and
judicial resources will result by requiring plaintiffs to bring piecemeal
litigation challenging site-specific activities.
VI. CONSEQUENCES AND OBSERVATIONS
A. Getting to Trial
In light of the above observations, attorneys might question how they
should go about getting their forest or resource management plan case to
trial. It is important to note that the pleadings should incorporate two
distinct concepts. First, the plaintiff's connection to the area that is the
subject of the agency action must be described. Second, the plaintiffs
statutorily protected interest that may be impaired by agency action must be
characterized, along with the possible injury that would result.
First, given the Lujan cases, it should be emphasized that facts must be
established with excruciating detail and methodology. It is not enough to
have visited the area at issue a few times or to have limited the use to a
small area. Therefore, choosing a plaintiff who has the requisite connection
to the managed area is of foremost importance. The challenger should be
someone who has used and enjoyed a wide portion of the area on a regular
185. Reply Brief of Appellant Reply at n.2, Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394
(9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-35047).
186. Stark Ackerman, Observations on the Transformation of the Forest Service: The
Effects of the National Environmental Policy Act on the U.S. Forest Service Decision
Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 703, 732 (1990).
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and repeated basis. Second, the description of the injury is the key to
establishing standing. The court, in determining standing, should be looking
at the injury in terms of the applicable law to determine what injustice that
law was created to prevent.'87 Therefore, the injury should not be expressed
as the lack of government action, such as an enforcement action, but as
government intrusion on a personal and concrete interest that is protected by
the underlying law. In resource plan litigation, this can translate into
describing the interest as an opportunity that is protected by the agency's
governing statute. For example, the plaintiffs injury should be character-
ized not as the lost ability to see a certain forest at a certain time, but as
impairment of the opportunity to experience a national forest, an interest
acknowledged by the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act and the National
Forest Management Act.'88 To describe the harm in terms of the legal
remedy available from the statute (i.e., from a favorable decision on the
merits) is to characterize the injury so that it satisfies both the injury in fact
and redressability requirements for standing.'89
Linking the injury with the remedy is also applicable in procedural
injury cases arising under the National Environmental Policy Act and the
Administrative Procedure Act. In such cases, it is frequently argued that
even if the agency had complied with the procedural regulations, its decision
would not have changed. Thus, the attorney should explain the injury as the
enhanced possibility of harm from the agency's failure to comply with
procedure.'90 To be absolutely sure that the procedural injury would suffice
for standing, it should be based upon a procedural interest protected by
187. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1950). This
case was the first to reject the previous standing formulation of "legal interest" where the
plaintiff's standing was determined by reference to the statutory or constitutional provision
at issue. The case instead required the showing of "injury in fact," an investigation into the
harm of the plaintiff without reference to the merits of the case. This new requirement does
not have a foundation in the history or text of the Constitution. See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Standing Injuries, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37; Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992).
188. Both of these Acts contemplate the continued use of the forest in a diverse way.
Not only are timber and resource interests recognized, but recreational, wildlife, and
wilderness concerns are also. See Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. § 528
(1994); National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600, 1604(e), 1604(g) (1994). See
generally, Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37, 50.
189. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37. This commentator
points out that the issue of standing is essentially the same question as whether the plaintiff
has a cause of action. Although this is conceptually similar to the zone of interest inquiry,
courts have split the injury (i.e., interest in the outcome of the case) and the cause of action
or remedy (i.e., the merits of the case) questions for the purpose of determining constitutional
standing. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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statute, result in an infringement of a recognized substantive interest, and be
particularized as to the plaintiffs. 9 '
It is notable that the facts and submitted affidavits of the environmental
plaintiffs in both Lujan cases were noticeably deficient. The Supreme Court
has not yet addressed a case where the plaintiffs pled with detail their
continued use and enjoyment of the area to be impacted by a challenged
resource plan.'92 This leaves open the possibility of distinguishing Lujan I
and Lujan II on their facts. For example, it is arguable that a forest plan is
intrinsically different from an ad hoc program as in Lujan L In addition, it
is arguable that adequate facts of the plaintiff's actual use of the environ-
mentally impacted area is all that is required under Sierra Club v. Morton,
regardless of what Lujan fL seems to require. 93
B. Consequences of the Circuit Holdings
If the Supreme Court approves the Eighth Circuit's rationale, the legal
analysis would have to arise from the assumption that the forest plans are
only innocuous blueprints of prescriptions that are essentially nonbinding.
This approach draws criticism in two main areas. First, there are many
instances where the plaintiffs' objection is with the plan itself, not with
immediate activities of the Forest Service. Each plan assumes a number of
things including overall strategy and primary emphasis. If a party is
concerned that, for example, ecosystem management is not being incorpo-
rated into forest management, how and when does he or she bring his or her
complaint? For this example it is absurd to expect a party to challenge only
on-the-ground activities, for that is not where the plaintiff's dissatisfaction
resides. The lack of review to challenge entire plans impairs the interests
of environmentalists and industry alike. Industry is just as likely to oppose
a broad new formula of resource management as environmentalists are likely
to complain that present strategies are outdated and harmful to the
environment. As the forest plans begin the stage of revision and amend-
ment, public participation should be enhanced in accord with congressional
intent, not limited.
191. Where a procedural injury affects the whole world as opposed to specifically
harming the plaintiff, the injury may not suffice for actual injury. See supra note 87.
192. This should not be too hard if the plaintiffs are actual users of a forest or
recreational area on a regular basis. In Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, for example, the
plaintiffs, who lived near the Flathead National Forest, frequently hiked, camped, and
generally enjoyed the entire forest area. Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d at 1394.
193. Remember that Lujan II involved projects in foreign lands to which plaintiffs may
"sometime" return. Although that was not adequate, it is unclear what level of use the Court
would have accepted as sufficient. See Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 555.
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Another major criticism of the Eighth Circuit's rationale and holding
is that agency actions, including broad planning initiatives, should not
escape review. As discussed in Part V, avoidance of review can occur if
plaintiffs are required to delay challenge. Not only is it possible that the
plans are never reviewed, but on-the-ground activities may also evade
consideration through an administrative game of hide-the-ball and strategic
withdrawal. If the Supreme Court adopts the Eighth Circuit's assumptions
and reasoning, the Court would be validating this denial of public participa-
tion. It is not the role of the Supreme Court to reduce the public's ability
to challenge government action when this right has been conveyed by
Congress through substantive statutes and the Administrative Procedure
Act.'94 It is further questionable whether prudential standing requirements
are supported by the simple constitutional mandate of "cases" and
"controversies." 195
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court follows the Ninth Circuit's
approach and decides that forest plans can directly impact site-specific
projects, the Court would be acknowledging the management framework that
Congress intended to control in the National Forest Management Act. The
Court would not be opening the floodgates of litigation, but would be
judicially recognizing the vital role public participation was meant to play
in the disposition of our nation's public resources. Proper management of
our natural resources is in the public interest, as well as a source of
particular and individual importance, especially for those who are economi-
cally dependent on the resources and for those who gain environmental
benefit from their existence. If the Ninth Circuit's formulation were
adopted, the majority of the burden from successful challenges would fall
on the Forest Service. The question, then, is who best should bear this
burden--the people and the courts, or the agency which is already required
to include public involvement and opinion in the planning process?
194. Counter to this argument is the judicial construction that the statutory grant of
review to "any person" does mean application to any person. This is the so-called
"separation of powers" approach to standing. In Lujan II Justice Scalia explains that
vindication of the public interest is the job of the legislature while the role of the courts is
to vindicate the rights of individuals. Scalia wrote that "to permit Congress to convert the
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an
'individual right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President
to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed." Lujan 11, 504 U.S. at 555.
195. That discussion, though interesting and relevant, is beyond the scope of this article.
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C. Conclusion
A challenger's ability to contest agency action that impacts resource
management is at stake in this controversy over forest plans. Extension of
the eventual rule could influence litigation concerning mineral leasing, oil
and gas exploration, rangeland disposition, and water allocations, to name
a few. As forest plans are developed, modified, and implemented, and the
courts are thus asked more frequently to intervene in the planning process,
the opportunity for a definitive Supreme Court ruling increases. Even
though proponents on both sides of the issue can justify their position, this
important issue cannot be resolved by simply relying on old notions of
standing and the assumed nature of the plans. The Court must instead
review its assumptions about agency process and statutory mandate.
Ultimately, this will require weighing arguments and observations that
combine numerous public policy concerns including the extent of public
participation in agency action, the role of the courts in effectuating this
participation, judicial and public efficiency, and the intentions of Congress.
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